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Comments on Terry Eagleton’s
“Base and Superstructure Revisited”
John Dupré
Let me first confess that, remarkably, I am also one of thosepeople who is skeptical about alien abduction but do suspect thatthere is something important about the distinction between base
and superstructure. Based on Eagleton’s estimate, I calculate that the
probability of two such people speaking at the same session is compa-
rable to the chance of winning the lottery and, paradoxically enough,
somewhat less than the chance that there really are alien abductions.
However, I do still have some doubts about how this distinction should
best be understood, some of which remain despite the many illuminat-
ing ideas in Eagleton’s paper.
Let me approach the issue in an obvious if possibly plodding way, by
saying a few words about the three obvious questions: What is the Base?
What is the Superstructure? And how are they related?
A society’s base, I take it, is the sum of its productive and reproductive
resources, and would include at least the means of production and the
relations of production. As Eagleton notes, there can be no doubt that
this is fundamental to society in the sense that there would be no society
without production of, at the very least, the necessities of human life.
But of course there is more than this banal truth involved in taking
seriously a doctrine of base and superstructure.
The superstructure is a more slippery concept. Sometimes it is
understood as meaning simply culture. As Eagleton nicely remarks, the
concept of culture tends to vacillate between the broadly anthropologi-
cal and the narrowly aesthetic, neither of which is of much use for the
present purpose. Eagleton, at any rate, presents a more interesting
concept of superstructure as that part of culture the function of which is
to contribute to the legitimation of the state. One important conse-
quence of this definition is that it clearly does not constitute base and
superstructure as exhaustive categories. Eagleton notes that a literary
work can be studied infrastructurally, as part of material production, or
superstructurally, as collusive with dominant power. And there is also the
possibility of reading it neither way: it may be scrutinized for symptoms
of subversion of the dominant power; or perhaps even treated as a
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purely aesthetic object. There is also a problem that begins to surface
here. If we think of the state as existing primarily to defend the relations
of production, and hence of the ideological function of the superstruc-
ture as being to defend the relations of production, then the superstruc-
ture will have been defined in relation to the base. This will threaten
some claims about the relation between the two with triviality.
So what of the relation between the two? Often, the Marxist doctrine
is taken to be that base determines superstructure. But this is not easy to
interpret. Certainly we shouldn’t understand, for example, any straight-
forward statement of efficient causation. A sufficient reason for this is
that the ideological function assigned to the superstructure could,
presumably, be served by a wide variety of different ideological struc-
tures. One more promising line might be the following. The function of
the state is to preserve the means of production and social relations of
production. This function is carried out both by exercises of physical
force and by ideological methods. The latter, more or less, constitutes
the superstructure. The base, then, determines the superstructure in the
sense that what counts as superstructure depends on the nature of the
economic base: the superstructure is whatever serves to give ideological
support to whatever in fact constitutes the economic base.
The problem with this interpretation is that it is merely analytic,
whereas we presumably were looking for a substantive claim about how
societies operate. Put another way, the claim about base determining
superstructure simply falls out of Eagleton’s perhaps rather idiosyncratic
definition of superstructure. What this gives us is a suggestion as to what
should make something count as an item of superstructure, but no idea
whether there are many or any such items. So perhaps the substantive
claim is not so much about the relation between base and superstruc-
ture—which proves to be merely analytic or conceptual—but rather in
the prevalence of the superstructural in culture. Here we can properly
locate Eagleton’s thesis that the superstructural dominates culture when
the economic base provides no more than the necessities of subsistence,
the situation characteristic of most of history and most of the world at
present. But economic surplus creates the possibility of cultural produc-
tion that can liberate itself from the role of ideological support of social
relations. And this is also a part of the reason for the vital point that
Eagleton stresses, that only a substantial economic surplus creates the
possibility of socialism. All this relates to Eagleton’s comments about the
economic, or more specifically, money, as a necessary condition of just
about anything else that might be wanted in a human life. We should
recall not only the necessity of money for the acquisition of anything,
but the necessity of acquiring certain things, the means of subsistence,
before it makes any sense to acquire anything else. These simple points
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illustrate the general idea at a more basic level. Base determines
everything, including superstructure, until there is a certain amount of
it. (More strictly, until that point the only ideological production is
superstructural.) Beyond that point the possibilities for choice, indi-
vidual self-expression, and so on begin to multiply.
Related to all this is Eagleton’s claim that one should be a socialist
because one doesn’t like work. Work is the realm of necessity and the
realm in which base determines superstructure. As we become liberated
from work so the superstructure becomes liberated from the base, or the
ideological becomes liberated from the superstructural. But this presup-
poses a very specific and perhaps inadequate conception of work, and
more should be said not only for William Morris, but even for Marx.
There are several very different traditions for thinking about work.
Certainly important is what Adam Smith—hardly a socialist—described
as toil and trouble, and what Marx conceived as alienated labor. But
surely we should also recognize Marx’s idea of purposeful transforma-
tion of nature as essential to the realization of humanity in the
individual, and the development of related ideas in Mill, Ruskin, or
Morris. There may be a good case for restricting the anyhow technical
term superstructure to specifically negative connotations, but doing so
for such a central and familiar term as work seems likely only to
confuse.1
Turning to a rather different matter, I find myself a little troubled by
the concept of function. I have helped myself to this concept in these
comments, and Eagleton does so in his paper. It is hard not to do so in
this area of thought. Eagleton writes, for instance, that “the function of
superstructure . . . is to help manage [contradictions in the economic
base] in the interests of the ruling class.” How is such a claim to be
understood? Sometimes “function” is used to imply an intention, but
presumably this does not apply here. (I don’t want to deny that
sometimes, perhaps often, policy is determined by members of the
ruling class in proverbially smoke-filled rooms. But presumably con-
spiracy theories will not provide a general explanation for social
functions.) Sometimes it refers to the role of something in a complex
mechanism, as when it is said that the function of the carburetor is to
regulate the proportions of fuel and air. But this only makes sense to the
extent that we think of society as a whole as having an ultimate goal or
purpose. Possibly Marx did sometimes think this; but it is an idea of
which I would be very suspicious. The only other interpretation of which
I am aware is that which is now most popular in biological applications
of the term, the idea that to say that the function of an X is to do F is to
say that the reason there are Xs is that they do F. This is the general idea
of which the existence of an intention is a special case, and for which
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natural selection provides the necessary nonintentional gloss for biol-
ogy. So, for instance, we have hearts because they circulate the blood
and that’s good for us, the connection between benefit and existence
being provided by the story of natural selection. Hence the function of
the heart is to pump blood. Perhaps there is a selective process by which
only those cultural forms that do something useful for the ruling class
are allowed to survive, and that justifies this kind of attribution of
function to elements of the superstructure. But I’m dubious about this,
and so I think there is a philosophical problem here that remains to be
sufficiently resolved.
Let me conclude with a matter on which perhaps—I’m not sure—I
disagree more substantially with Eagleton. This is the matter of essential-
ism. Eagleton writes: “Marx’s anthropology comes down in the end to
what we share in virtue of the structure of our bodies, to our ‘species-
being’ as he terms it—a thoroughly essentialist doctrine, naturally, and
all the better for that.” Essentialism is a topic on which I’ve spilled a
good deal of critical ink,2  and I naturally find this remark provocative.
The problem is that we share very little in virtue of the structure of our
bodies. It is important, certainly, that we share some basic needs—food,
water, shelter, and so on—and, as Eagleton rightly emphasizes, most of
humankind has been mainly concerned with the satisfaction of its most
basic needs. But if there were an essence of humanity in the sense
Eagleton requires, it would certainly go much beyond the most basic
needs, and in ways that Eagleton in fact notes. I take it that when, just
after the last quoted passage (interrupted only by some Aristotelian
metaphysics that struck me as obscure even by the standards of Aristote-
lian metaphysics), he says that we cannot answer questions like, “Why
should we take delight in each other’s company?”, the reason is that our
liking for one another’s company is part of what it is to be creatures of
the kind we are. I think this is more or less true, but not usefully put in
terms of essences. Sociopaths are still human so that this species-typical
characteristic is not as basic as, say, the need for water. There is, I think,
a continuous spectrum from what is absolutely physically necessary for
human survival, through that without which almost no humans will
thrive, to those things in which only humans with very specific tastes
have any interest. This is a way of putting things that has no problem
stating facts about all or most humans, acknowledges the crucial
distinction between needs and desires often rejected by both post-
modernists and neoclassical economists, but does this in a way that has
no truck with essentialism.
In the end I’m fairly sure Eagleton can’t be an essentialist. He writes
that “that continuous transgression or self-transcendence which we call
history, or culture, is part of our nature.” This seems to me importantly
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true. But surely self-transcendence is just what one cannot hope to do to
an essential nature. While I am reluctant to accuse Terry Eagleton of
being insufficiently dialectical, in biology, at least, it does seem that
essentialism is naturally opposed to dialectics. To transcend one’s nature
is to leave it behind and construct a new and different one; if that nature
is one’s essence, to do this is not to transcend one’s self but to destroy it.
This needs to be said in a way that does not deny obvious and important
truths about our physical needs; but it needs to be said. One reason it
needs to be said is that essentialism, it seems to me, leads inexorably to
biologism, something one might be tempted, though surely wrongly, to
associate with Marx’s talk about species-being. Biologism, as in contem-
porary sociobiology recently renamed evolutionary psychology, is a
booming intellectual project, and it typifies the problems with essential-
ism. Sociobiology presents human nature as fixed by forces in the
distant past and in a great variety of ways, most notably those to do with
gender relations, as incapable of, or at least highly resistant to, self-
transcendence. And it is this kind of example, I think, that has led so
many radicals, perhaps even including Eagleton, to reject essentialism.
There is a straight and narrow path, I hope and believe, between being
dashed on the unyielding Scylla of essentialism, and being sucked down
into the formless Charybdis of postmodernism.
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